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TO USDEL SECRETARY PRIORITY

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EXDIS - FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO

SUBJECT:NATO MINISTERIAL: OBJECTIVES AND TALKING POINTS

FOLLOWING ARE THE OBJECTIVES PAPER FOR THE DECEMBER 9-10
NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IN BRUSSELS, AS WELL AS
DRAFT CONSOLIDATED TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR USE IN THE NAC
RESTRICTED SESSION DECEMBER 9. THESE MATERIALS DO NOT
INCLUDE THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS REGARDING NO FIRST USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND A FREEZE ON NEW MEMBERS FOR NATO
OR THE PACT, WHICH WE ARE NOW ANALYZING.

BEGIN OBJECTIVES PAPER.

SETTING.

THE DECEMBER BRUSSELS MINISTERIAL WILL TAKE PLACE DURING A
PERIOD OF TRANSITION. YOUR PRESENTATION THIS YEAR WILL
NECESSARILY BE MORE PHILOSOPHICAL AND REFLECTIVE. ABOVE
ALL, THE ALLIES WILL BE INTERESTED IN THE COURSE THE NEW
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ADMINISTRATION WILL CHART IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING
BOTH POSSIBLE NEW DIRECTIONS AS WELL AS THE CONSTANTS
THAT WILL CONTINUE TO UNDERLIE AMERICAN POLICY. WE
OBVIOUSLY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PROVIDE THE FORMER, BUT

ALLIES WILL WELCOME YOUR PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LATTER.

YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL ALSO WISH YOUR VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY ABOUT HEIGHTENED SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES AS THEY AFFECT EUROPE. THEY WILL BE CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA IN THE WAKE OF ANGOLA AND IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING TENSION AND UNCERTAINTY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. AND THEY WILL WISH TO KNOW HOW YOU PERSONALLY RELATE THESE ISSUES TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE OVER THE COMING PERIOD.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE ALLIES WILL WANT TO DISCUSS HOW BEST TO CHART A COMMON COURSE FOR BELGRADE. THEY WILL VIEW THESE BROAD ISSUES IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY IN WESTERN EUROPE AND UNCERTAINTY CONCERNING THE FUTURE ROLE OF WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES, PARTICULARLY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE PCI WILL BE ABLE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS PATTERN OF GROWING INFLUENCE IN ITALY.

ALLIED CONCERNS WILL ALSO FOCUS ON OTHER ISSUES RELATING TO NATO'S ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY WELL BEING. SOME OF THESE ARE THEMES IN YOUR PROPOSED TALKING POINTS, WHILE OTHERS WILL BE IN THE MINDS OF YOUR COLLEAGUES.

-- ECONOMIC PROSPECTS REMAIN A CAUSE FOR SERIOUS CONCERN GIVEN THE PROSPECT OF OIL PRICE INCREASES, AND WITH THE LATEST OECD ESTIMATES PROJECTING A CONTINUING CYCLE OF INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG THE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL POWERS. THE SITUATION IS PARTICULARLY ACUTE FOR THE UK, WHERE THE NECESSITY OF KEEPING THE BRITISH ECONOMY AND THE POUND SOLVENT CHALLENGES BRITAIN'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND FURTHER DEFENSE CUTS. ITALY'S CONDITION IS ALSO PRECARIOUS, AND ALL ALLIES FACE ECONOMIC PRESSURES AND

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COMPETING DEMANDS FOR SCARCE RESOURCES.

-- GREECE AND TURKEY CONTINUE TO BE LOCKED IN THEIR DISPUTES OVER CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN. ALTHOUGH THE ATMOSPHERE IS IN SOME RESPECTS LESS TENSE THAN SIX MONTHS AGO, A NEW UNDERTONE HAS BEEN ADDED BY GREECE'S ASSUMPTION THAT THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION WILL VIEW THINGS MORE FAVORABLY FROM THE GREEK POINT OF VIEW.

-- APPREHENSION HAS GROWN IN EUROPE ABOUT SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES, AND MAY HAVE BEEN FURTHER STIMULATED BY GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S REPORT ASSERTING THAT NATO COULD NOT WITHSTAND A SURPRISE SOVIET ATTACK, A VIEW WHICH

APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SECONDED RECENTLY BY SENATORS NUNN AND BARTLETT. ALLIED CONCERNS NEED TO BE PUT IN PERSPECTIVE LEST THEY PRODUCE A FATALISTIC MOOD RATHER THAN A WILLINGNESS TO MAINTAIN THE NECESSARY DEFENSE EFFORTS.

-- FUTURE U.S. INTENTIONS ON ALLIANCE THEATER NUCLEAR POSTURE ARE A SUBJECT OF CONTINUING UNEASE, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE TAKEN A SERIES OF REASSURING STEPS IN THE PAST YEAR.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE CONTINUING SIGNS OF ALLIED STRENGTH AND VIGOR:

-- OVERALL ALLIED COHESION REMAINS STRONG, AND POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION AMONG ALLIES ARE EXCELLENT, AS IN DISCUSSIONS OVER CSCE BELGRADE PREPARATIONS.

-- NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES HAVE IMPROVED IN IMPORTANT RESPECTS DESPITE SOME SLIPPAGE BY ALLIES SUCH AS BELGIUM AND ITALY, AND FURTHER DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS BY THE UK. MAJOR FACTORS ARE CONTINUING FORCE IMPROVEMENTS BY THE FRG AND THE US, INCLUDING THE GREATER COMBAT CAPABILITIES RESULTING FROM FRG FORCE RESTRUCTURING, THE STATIONING OF TWO ADDITIONAL US COMBAT BRIGADES IN GERMANY, THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY, AND THE SOLID INCREASE IN US AIR CAPABILITIES IN EUROPE PROMISED FOR 1977 IN THE US DPQ RESPONSE.

-- HIGH-LEVEL ALLIED ATTENTION CONTINUES TO FOCUS ON THE
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NEED FOR GREATER RATIONALIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPE'S DEFENSE POSTURE, FORCES, AND EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS THE INTEROPERABILITY OF NATO EQUIPMENT AND FORCES. IN PARTICULAR, INCREASED EUROPEAN--INCLUDING FRENCH--EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE YEAR-OLD EUROPEAN PROGRAM GROUP, WHICH HAS RECENTLY INTENSIFIED ITS WORK ON IMPORTANT SPECIFIC AREAS OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE

PRODUCTION COOPERATION. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SOME MOVEMENT TOWARDS GREATER INTEROPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT, ALTHOUGH BASIC PROGRESS IN STANDARDIZATION CONTINUES TO BE DISAPPOINTING.

-- RELATIONS HAVE BEEN REESTABLISHED BETWEEN ICELAND AND THE UK.

-- A POSITIVE POLITICAL CLIMATE CONTINUES IN PORTUGAL, ALTHOUGH WITH OMINOUS CONCERNS OVER ECONOMIC STABILITY.

YOUR EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION.

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, ALLIED MINISTERS WILL LOOK TO

Y"U FOR YOUR EVALUATION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE, AND US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS. THEY WILL WELCOME YOUR RETROSPECTION ON THE KEY ACHIEVEMENTS IN THESE AREAS IN RECENT YEARS AND WILL SEEK YOUR VIEWS ON THE STATUS OF MAJOR ISSUES ON NATO'S AGENDA SUCH AS CSCE AND MBFR, AND ALSO ON SALT.

OF EQUAL INTEREST TO ALLIES WILL BE YOUR PERSONAL VTE S ON PROSPECTS FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN THE FUTURE. OBVIOUSLY, YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL NOT EXPECT SPECIFIC PREDICTIONS OF WHAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION MAY OR MAY NOT DO. THEY WILL, HOWEVER, BE ACUTELY INTERESTED IN YOUR OWN VIEWS ON THE DYNAMICS AND LIMITATIONS WHICH SHAPE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY OVER THE LONG TERM, INDEPENDENT OF CHANGES IN ADMINISTRATIONS.

SPECIFICALLY, YOU MAY WISH TO:

-- REAFFIRM THAT US POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE REMAINS CONSTANT
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IN ITS BROAD OUTLINES BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS AND VALUES WHICH TRANSCEND ELECTORAL EVENTS. THUS, THE US COMMITMENT TO NATO REMAINS A CONSTANT OF OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR REASONS OF OUR NATIONAL INTEREST; SO DOES A COMMON US AND ALLIED INTEREST IN A REALISTIC STABILIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.

-- DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OVERALL BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, INCLUDING YOUR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET CONDUCT IN THE THIRD WORLD, BOTH AS REFLECTED IN ANGOLA AND THEREAFTER, AS WELL AS IN YOUR RECENT INITIATIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE ALLIES WILL ALSO WISH TO HEAR YOUR VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CHINA, AND ON SOVIET POLICIES IN THESE AREAS. ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE ON

FUTURE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL BE GREETED WITH GREAT INTEREST.

-- STRESS THAT, IN ASSESSING ANY GLOBAL BALANCE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER, AS YOU POINTED OUT IN YOUR ALISTAIR BUCHAN SPEECH, THAT THE WEST'S STRENGTHS LIE NOT ONLY IN RESOURCES OR ARMS LEVELS, BUT ABOVE ALL IN OUR WILL, OUR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DYNAMISM, AND IN THE WAY ADVERSARIES PERCEIVE OUR RESOLVE.

-- PROVIDE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF SOVIET AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BOTH THE PLUSES AND MINUSES, INCLUDING THOSE FEATURES WHICH ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN CONSTANTS. TWO ASPECTS WHICH MIGHT BE NOTED IN PARTICULAR ARE THE ROLE CSCE CAN PLAY IN INFLUENCING

SOVIET BEHAVIOR ON IMPORTANT ISSUES OF HUMAN CONTACT AND INFORMATION, AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR A STRONG NATO DEFENSE AS ESSENTIAL TO ANY REALISTIC EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE EAST.

-- PRESENT YOUR VIEWS ON HOW TO CONDUCT CSCE AT BELGRADE, STRESSING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION, SELECTIVE ALLIED INITIATIVES TO MOVE AHEAD FURTHER ON FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS, AND OUR WISH TO AVOID ANY POST-BELGRADE ALL-EUROPEAN POLITICAL ORGAN.

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-- ASSESS THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, INCLUDING MAJOR ISSUES IN SALT AND PROSPECTS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LONG-TERM US GOALS AND OVERALL ALLIANCE INTERESTS; AND OFFER YOUR THOUGHTS ON MBFR AND ITS PLACE IN ALLIANCE SECURITY THINKING AND IN THE PATTERN OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

-- REMIND THE ALLIES OF THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THEIR DEFENSE EFFORTS, AND TO PURSUE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, RATIONALIZATION, AND STANDARDIZATION OF FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME, STRESS THAT, WHILE THERE ARE DISTURBING DEVELOPMENTS IN (AND CERTAINLY MORE DISTURBING PUBLIC ANALYSES OF) THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE, THESE ARE NO CAUSE FOR HAND-WRINGING, AND NATO'S BASIC HEALTH REMAINS SOUND. FURTHER, NATO'S STRATEGY BASED ON THE TRIAD OF CONVENTIONAL, THEATER-NUCLEAR, AND STRATEGIC FORCES REMAINS A VALID FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE.

THE NAC FORMAT AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS.

THE ALLIES HAVE AGREED TO A RESTRICTED NAC SESSION AS AT PREVIOUS MINISTERIALS. ATTENDANCE WILL BE LIMITED TO MINISTERS, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES, PLUS FIVE,

INCLUDING ONE NOTETAKER.

AS IN THE PAST, LUNS WILL TURN TO YOU TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THE DISCUSSION AT THE RESTRICTED SESSION. THE CONSOLIDATED TALKING POINTS PREPARED FOR YOU ARE KEYED TO NEW DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE LAST MINISTERIAL, SUCH AS SOVIET POLICY AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS AFTER ANGOLA; AND TO CONTINUING SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THE ALLIANCE, SUCH AS SALT, MBFR AND CSCE. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL TOPICS IS AVAILABLE UNDER SPECIFIC SUBJECT HEADINGS.

THE MINISTERS WILL FOLLOW THE PATTERN YOU SET AND WILL DEAL WITH THE ISSUES THROUGH DISCUSSION, RATHER THAN BY SET SPEECHES.

IN VIEW OF YOUR ARRIVAL IN BRUSSELS ONE DAY BEFORE THE

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MINISTERIAL, WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT YOU HOLD A LARGER NUMBER OF BILATERAL MEETINGS THAN YOU HAVE AT PAST NATO MINISTERIALS. YOU HAVE APPROVED AND WE ARE SEEKING BILATERALS WITH: SYG LUNS, EC COMMISSIONER SOAMES, THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, TURKEY, CANADA, NORWAY, THE FRG, FRANCE, AND LUXEMBOURG. ADDITIONALLY, WE HAVE INFORMED THE BELGIANS THAT YOU WILL ARRIVE EARLY IN CASE KING BAUDOUIN SHOULD WISH YOU TO CALL ON HIM. THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER WILL BE HELD AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO BELGIUM ON WEDNESDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 8.

THE AGENDA.

STANDARDIZATION/INTEROPERABILITY WILL BE THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA, AND SOME DEFENSE MINISTERS MAY ALSO BE PRESENT. WHILE WE EXPECT DETAILED DISCUSSION WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THE DPC MINISTERIAL IN BRUSSELS, DECEMBER 7-8, YOU MAY BE ASKED FOR VIEWS ON THE EUROPEAN PROGRAM GROUP AND ON NATO'S CONDUCT OF INTEROPERABILITY WORK.

THE PRINCIPAL DISCUSSION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE WILL TAKE PLACE AS USUAL IN THE RESTRICTED SESSION. WE FORESEE A WIDE-RANGING DEBATE TOUCHING ON THE NATO/WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE, CHINA, CSCE, SALT AND MBFR, AND SOVIET PENETRATION IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

IN ADDITION, THERE WILL BE A PLENARY SESSION TO CONSIDER NATO REPORTS ON CSCE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.

THE COMMUNIQUE.

THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD STRESS ADHERENCE OF ALLIES TO THE BASIC OBJECTIVES OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTINUITY OF ALLIED POLICY. IT SHOULD CONTAIN A REAFFIRMATION OF ALLIED DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THE SOLIDARITY AND STRENGTH THAT ARE THE PREREQUISITES FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

THE NEED FOR A STRONG DEFENSE SHOULD BE GIVEN EMPHASIS BY
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POINTING OUT THAT THE SECURITY DERIVED FROM ALLIED DEFENSE EFFORTS PROVIDES THE CONFIDENCE ESSENTIAL TO THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY OF ALLIED SOCIETIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE FACE OF THE CONTINUING GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH.

THE ALLIES WILL WISH TO GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO CSCE IMPLEMENTATION, IN VIEW OF THE APPROACH OF THE BELGRADE FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS. THE COMMUNIQUE MIGHT UNDERLINE THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE COURSE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, EXPRESS REGRET THAT MORE HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED THUS FAR, AND STATE THE HOPE THAT FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS WILL BE MADE PRIOR TO THE NEXT MINISTERIAL.

THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD ALSO CONTAIN REFERENCES TO STANDARDIZATION, MBFR, SALT, BERLIN, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

TALKING POINTS FOR THE RESTRICTED SESSION
OF THE NAC

-- I APPEAR TODAY AS ONE WHO IS ABOUT TO BECOME AN "ELDER STATESMAN"; THAT STATUS ALLOWS ME TO PONTIFICATE EVEN MORE FREELY THAN I NORMALLY DO.

-- AT TIMES LIKE THIS ONE IS TEMPTED TO LOOK BACK, TO REFLECT ON WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED OVER THE PAST EIGHT YEARS; I WILL TRY TO LEAVE GRADING TO THE HISTORIANS-- WHICH IS NOT ENTIRELY UNFORTUNATE SINCE IT SEEMS MY DESTINY SOON TO BE NUMBERED AGAIN IN THEIR MIDST.

-- OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD NOT BE PROPER FOR ME TO SPECULATE ON POSSIBLE POLICIES OR INITIATIVES OF THE NEW CARTER ADMINISTRATION; HOWEVER, I CAN SAY WITH ASSURANCE THAT US POLICY TOWARD EUROPE AND THE ALLIANCE IS BASED ON LONG-TERM CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARE CONSTANT AND TRANSCEND DOMESTIC POLITICS. ALL OF YOU HAVE DOUBTLESS NOTED THAT DURING OUR ELECTION THERE WAS BROAD AGREEMENT ON THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO AND ALLIED UNITY TO AMERICA'S SECURITY.

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-- WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK OF ATLANTIC COOPERATION, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVOLVING NATURE OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE WHICH THIS ALLIANCE HAS MET SUCCESSFULLY NOW FOR A GENERATION. DURING THE PAST 27 YEARS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAVE OF COURSE CHANGED--FOR, AS HERACLITUS OBSERVED 2500 YEARS AGO, THE WORLD IS IN CONSTANT TRANSITION. BUT THE STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN ITS ABILITY TO ADJUST TO THESE CHANGES. INDEED, IT IS THAT REMARKABLE STRENGTH, COHESION, AND STAYING POWER WHICH HAS PROVED THE ENDURING VALUE OF OUR COMMON COMMITMENTS TO NATO.

THE EVOLVING NATURE OF SOVIET POWER

-- IN THE EARLY POST-REVOLUTIONARY YEARS THE SOVIETS RELIED MAINLY ON IDEOLOGICAL PENETRATION AND SUBVERSION TO PURSUE THEIR ENDS. AFTER WORLD WAR II, THEY WERE ABLE TO EXPAND BECAUSE OF WAR-WROUGHT WEAKNESS ON THE PERIPHERIES OF SOVIET TERRITORY--A SITUATION NATO WAS CREATED TO REMEDY. TODAY, ALTHOUGH THEIR IDEOLOGY HAS DECLINED IN ITS APPEAL, THEIR PHYSICAL STRENGTH HAS GROWN. WE MUST DEAL WITH THE POSSIBLE DANGERS OF THAT GROWING STRENGTH.

-- AS I POINTED OUT LAST MAY IN OSLO, SOVIET POWER HAS DEVELOPED UNEVENLY. THE SOVIETS ARE BESET BY MAJOR BUREAUCRATIC AND ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCIES AND HAMPERED BY LEADERSHIP UNCERTAINTIES. THEIR SCOPE FOR INITIATIVES IS

CONSTRAINED BY THE RIGIDITIES OF A CLOSED AND TIGHTLY-CONTROLLED SOCIETY.

--MARXIST/LENINIST IDEOLOGY, WHICH JUSTIFIES THE REGIME, HAS LOST VITALITY AND PURPOSE--IT HAS DEMONSTRATED LITTLE RELEVANCE FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD, WHERE SOVIET INFLUENCE HAS BEEN LARGELY A DERIVATIVE OF THE USSR'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IN FACT, THIS IDEOLOGY IS INCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT IN AN AGE CHARACTERIZED BY NATIONAL RIVALRIES IN THE THIRD WORLD AND NUCLEAR STANDOFF BETWEEN THE FIRST TWO. AND IT CONTINUES TO SUFFER FROM ITS BASIC WEAKNESS: IT CANNOT
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MOTIVATE PEOPLE WITHOUT COERCION. HOWEVER, SUBJECTIVELY, THE IDEOLOGY DOES PROVIDE RATIONALE FOR SOVIET OPPORTUNISM IN THE THIRD WORLD.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR IN WHAT SENSE THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW A MILITARY POWER OF UNPRECEDENTED PROPORTION. IN THE FIRST PLACE MOSCOW HAS ACQUIRED STRATEGIC PARITY--A PROCESS THAT THE WEST COULD NOT INHIBIT OR INFLUENCE. FORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, NEW INCREMENTS OF STRATEGIC POWER DO NOT LEAD INEVITABLY TO MILITARY OR POLITICAL GAINS, CERTAINLY NOT AS LONG AS THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IS MAINTAINED. WE HAVE MAINTAINED THAT STRATEGIC BALANCE. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. IN THE SECOND PLACE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALSO STRENGTHENED AND EXTENDED THE RANGE AND QUALITY OF ITS CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY, THUS ENABLING THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO CONSIDER EXPLOITING A WIDER RANGE OF OPPORTUNITIES THAN PREVIOUSLY. THIS GROWTH IN CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY POSES OUR ALLIANCE WITH PRESENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES.

-- THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA WAS DICTATED PRIMARILY BY OPPORTUNISM, BUT IT ALSO HAD A CERTAIN IDEOLOGICAL BIAS. BY THEIR ACTIONS IN ANGOLA, THE SOVIETS SHOWED THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO EXPLOIT A TARGET

OF OPPORTUNITY. BUT THEIR ACTIONS IN ANGOLA ADDED GREATLY AND DISPROPORTIONATELY TO THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN IMPROVING EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO MOSCOW THAT SUPPORT FROM THE US PUBLIC AND CONGRESS FOR THE EAST-WEST NEGOTIATION PROCESS WILL DEPEND IN GREAT MEASURE ON SOVIET RESTRAINT IN THE THIRD WORLD. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE INTEND TO WATCH CAREFULLY ANY SOVIET EFFORTS TO COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

-- SINCE THE SINAI AGREEMENT, SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS CONTINUED TO DECLINE. THE FIGHTING

AND QUARRELING BETWEEN MOSCOW'S CLIENTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE LEBANON CREATED A SITUATION FROM WHICH MOSCOW COULD NOT PROFIT. THEIR TIES WITH DAMASCUS, IN PARTICULAR, WERE STRAINED. WHILE WELCOMING AN END TO THE SECRET

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LEBANESE FIGHTING, THE SOVIETS SEEM WARY THE SAUDI ROLE IN PROMOTING A SYRIAN/PALESTINIAN/EGYPTIAN MODUS VIVENDI. CONTINUED SOVIET DISTRUST OF SADAT ALSO IS CLEAR FROM THE LOW-KEY TREATMENT WHICH MOSCOW GAVE THE FAHMY-GROMYKO MEETING. WE, THEREFORE, DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY MAJOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND THE KEY ARAB COUNTRIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-- THE FOCUS OF SOVIET ATTENTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN ON EUROPE. BUT MOSCOW'S TROUBLE-MAKING IN THE UNDER-DEVELOPED WORLD CAN CREATE DISHARMONY AMONG THE EUROPEAN POWERS, A POTENTIAL WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE PREDISPOSED BY THEIR IDEOLOGY TO EXPLOIT. HENCE, NATO MUST TAKE JUDICIOUS NOTICE OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THEIR ENTIRETY, BOTH WITHIN AND BEYOND THE TREATY AREA.

-- WHILE SOVIET POLICY HAS AN OPPORTUNISTIC BENT, ITS PRIMARY CONCERN IS WITH SECURITY. THIS HAS CREATED OPPORTUNITIES TO REACH COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE.

-- CONCERN FOR SECURITY HAS ALSO INCLINED THE SOVIETS TO TRY EXTENDING THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE GLACIS OF EASTERN EUROPE. THIS EFFORT HAS BEEN FACILITATED BY THE PATTERN OF ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES IN THE REGION, ESPECIALLY PRONOUNCED AT PRESENT IN POLAND. THESE WEAKNESSES ARE A TWO-EDGED SWORD FOR MOSCOW, HOWEVER. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY ENCOURAGE DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION; ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY PROMOTE INTERNAL INSTABILITY.

-- SOVIET-ROMANIAN RELATIONS HAVE BECOME MORE ACTIVE RECENTLY. THIS ACTIVITY MAY BE INSPIRED BY A ROMANIAN

PERCEPTION THAT RECENT SOVIET ASSURANCES AGAINST "INTERFERENCE" IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER PARTIES AND STATES CAN BE EXPLOITED AND FOSTERED THROUGH IMPROVED RELATIONS. THE ROMANIANS MAY ALSO BE SEEKING ECONOMIC BENEFITS. FINALLY, ROMANIAN WILLINGNESS TO DRAW CLOSER TO MOSCOW MAY BE A PRODUCT OF THEIR CONCERN REGARDING POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA.

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-- CERTAINLY YUGOSLAVIA WILL CONTINUE TO LOOM LARGE IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY EQUATION. TITO HAS SOUGHT TO PREPARE YUGOSLAVIA FOR A SMOOTH TRANSITION UPON HIS DEPARTURE, AND THE YUGOSLAVS THEMSELVES MAY FEEL

CONFIDENT OF THEIR ABILITY TO DETER FOREIGN ENCROACHMENT. BUT THEIR SUSPICIONS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS REMAIN HIGH. AND IF WE TAKE AS A GIVEN MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN EXTENDING ITS INFLUENCE OVER YUGOSLAVIA, AND ADD TO IT THE LATENT CENTRIFUGAL FORCES IN THAT COUNTRY, THE POTENTIAL DANGER FOR THE REGION IS SERIOUS.

-- BECAUSE OF YUGOSLAV SENSITIVITIES IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR THIS ALLIANCE TO DISCUSS MILITARY CONTINGENCIES IT IS OBVIOUSLY WISE POLICY, HOWEVER, TO ENCOURAGE STATEMENTS AND PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO PRESERVE YUGOSLAV INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY.

-- THE INTERESTS THAT IMPELLED THE SOVIETS TOWARD A DETENTE POLICY REMAIN: THE DESIRE TO BE ACCEPTED AS CO-EQUAL WITH THE US, THE NEED FOR WESTERN TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY; A RELATIVELY CALM ATMOSPHERE TO PROMOTE PRODUCTIVITY AT HOME; A DESIRE TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE; AND CONTINUING CONCERN OVER CHINA.

-- REGARDING CHINA, THE LEADERSHIP CHANGES HAVE OBVIOUSLY GIVEN THE SOVIETS AN INCENTIVE TO SEEK RELIEF FROM THE PRESSURES THEY HAVE FELT FROM THE CHINESE. THEY ARE CURRENTLY LAUNCHED ON A CAMPAIGN TO CONVINCE US THAT THERE IS A WARMING TREND. WE ALL SEEM TO BE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT ANY SINO-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT WOULD BE LIMITED IN EXTENT. IN WHAT WE SAY PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD BETRAY NO SIGN OF CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE SINO-SOVIET DETENTE, SINCE THAT WOULD ONLY PERSUADE THE SOVIETS THAT THEY HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL LEVERAGE OVER US.

-- THUS, THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS A COMBINATION OF POWER AND VULNERABILITY. SOVIET MILITARY POWER WILL CONTINUE TO GROW, AS WILL A SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PROJECT THAT
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POWER IN GLOBAL TERMS AND POSSIBLY IN EUROPE AS WELL. YET THE SOVIET UNION IS CONSTRAINED BY INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS, SOME OF WHICH CAN BE INFLUENCED BY THE WEST. THE STRATEGY THAT WE HAVE DEVELOPED SINCE THE HARMEL REPORT HAS NOT LOST ITS RELEVANCE. TO CONTINUE TO IMPLEMENT IT, WE WILL NEED TO MAINTAIN OUR RESOLVE AND A STEADINESS OF POLICY, RECALLING THAT A SOUND ALLIED DEFENSE REMAINS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. I DO NOT PRETEND THAT THIS CHALLENGE WILL BE EASY, PARTICULARLY AT A TIME OF SEVERE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY. IT IS A CHALLENGE TO WESTERN WILL AS WELL AS TO OUR RESOURCES. BUT IT IS A CHALLENGE THAT WE ARE CAPABLE OF MEETING AND THAT WE MUST MEET.

THE NATO RESPONSE--STRENGTH

-- THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT FACT ABOUT NATO IS ITS REMARKABLE SUCCESS IN KEEPING THE PEACE. WHEN NATO WAS FOUNDED THE THREAT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY WAS IMMEDIATE AND PROFOUND. OVER THE YEARS NATO HAS ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED THE BALANCE. THERE IS NO REASON WHY OUR ABILITY TO DO SO SHOULD FALTER.

-- IN MEETING THE STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WITH OUR OWN WE FACE TWO DANGERS. THE FIRST IS THAT WE WILL INDULGE OURSELVES IN THE RHETORIC OF WEAKNESS, OVER-ESTIMATING THE THREAT FROM THE EAST AND THEREBY FOSTERING ATTITUDES OF DEFEATISM AND PANIC.

-- THE SOVIETS ARE MODERNIZING THEIR FORCES AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. BUT SO ARE WE. I NEED NOT REVIEW ALL THE IMPORTANT STEPS WE HAVE TAKEN, BUT SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT IN THE PAST YEAR THE US MILITARY BUDGET HAS INCREASED BY 13.3 BILLION DOLLARS, ADDITIONAL COMBAT TROOPS HAVE BEEN SENT TO THE CENTRAL REGION, AND FURTHER COMMITMENTS OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN MADE. SURELY, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO TRADE PLACES WITH THE SOVIETS IN TERMS OF THE MILITARY STRENGTH WE POSSESS BOTH NOW AND FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

-- NATO STRATEGY BASED ON THE TRIAD OF CONVENTIONAL,
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TACTICAL-NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC FORCES HAS SERVED US WELL. I SEE NO NEED FOR RADICAL NEW CONCEPTS. THE KEY TO DETERRING A SOVIET ATTACK REMAINS THE LINKAGE OF ALL OUR CAPABILITIES IN A CONTINUUM FROM CONVENTIONAL TO STRATEGIC FORCES, WHICH MAINTAINS THE DETERRENT ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE THREATS.

-- IN ASSESSING OUR COMMON STRENGTHS AGAINST THOSE OF OUR ADVERSARIES WE SHOULD ALSO BEAR IN MIND THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC BALANCE. HOWEVER HEAVY THE ECONOMIC PRESSURES MAY BE THAT SQUEEZE US AT THIS MOMENT, OUR SOCIETIES AND OUR ECONOMIES POSSESS THE ABILITIES TO FORGE AHEAD. OVER TIME, WE HAVE THE CREATIVITY TO FIND NEW SOLUTIONS TO SEEMINGLY INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS AND THE FLEXIBILITY TO ADOPT THEM. THESE QUALITIES REMAIN THE ENVY OF THE USSR REGARDLESS OF MOSCOW'S DOCTRINAL PESSIMISM ABOUT MIXED ECONOMIES.

-- IF THE FIRST DANGER IS OVERESTIMATING OUR ADVERSARIES, THE SECOND IS COMPLACENCY. THE BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST MUST BE CONSTANTLY MONITORED IF IT IS TO BE MAINTAINED. THE SOVIETS ARE NOT STANDING

STILL, AND WE MUST BE CONSTANTLY ALERT TO CHANGES IN THE SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE BOTH QUALITATIVELY AND QUANTITATIVELY. AS I STRESSED IN MAY, MILITARY PROCUREMENT DECISIONS HAVE A LONG LEAD TIME; THE DECISIONS WE TAKE NOW WILL AFFECT THE BALANCE 10 TO 15 YEARS HENCE.

-- THE STRENGTH OF NATO IS NOT ONLY MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, HOWEVER; IT IS ALSO POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND MORAL. MILITARY SECURITY WITHOUT A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSENSUS WILL, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, PROVE UNATTAINABLE. DEFENSE COOPERATION WITHOUT A FOUNDATION OF COMMON VALUES WILL LACK THE LONG-TERM BASIS FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT. THUS, WE MUST SET AS A MAJOR PRIORITY THE REVIVAL OF OUR ECONOMIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. WE MUST CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE HUMAN VALUES IN OUR FOLLOW-ON WORK ON CSCE. AND WE MUST CONTINUE TO IMPROVE THE BROAD-RANGING POLITICAL CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION THAT HAS PROVEN A REMARKABLE ASSET FOR
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OUR POLICIES TOWARD THE EAST, FOR OUR APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD, AND FOR OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH EACH OTHER.

-- IN DOING SO, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT A LARGE PART OF THE VALUE OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG US DERIVES FROM THE FLEXIBILITY OF FORUMS WE HAVE MAINTAINED--IN NATO, IN US-EC CONSULTATION, IN THE OECD, IN INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY SUMMITS, AND IN BILATERAL TIES.

-- IN THE HEAT OF OUR POLITICAL CAMPAIGN I WAS ONCE ACCUSED OF MAKING AN ALLUSION TO ATHENS AND SPARTA IN A TOPICAL SENSE. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHAT I DID OR DID NOT SAY ON THAT OCCASION, THERE ARE CERTAIN LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE COMPARISON. THE FIRST IS

THAT IN THE AGE OF ITS GREATEST DEVOTION TO DEMOCRACY, ATHENS WON HISTORIC ENCOUNTERS WITH INVADING FORCES AGAINST OVERWHELMING ODDS; THE SECOND IS THAT THE DEFEAT OF ATHENS IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR WAS THE RESULT OF INTERNAL WEAKNESSES AND THE FAILURE OF ITS ALLIANCE SYSTEM. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS WERE NOT AT FAULT--RATHER, THE PROBLEM WAS A LACK OF RESPONSIBLE AND EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP, MORAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL.

THE IMPERATIVE OF DETENTE

-- LET ME NOW TURN TO THE OTHER COMPONENT OF THE NATO RESPONSE.

-- DETENTE, AS DEFINED IN ITS TRADITIONAL SENSE AND AS USED IN THE HARMEL REPORT, IS THE NATURAL AND NECESSARY

COMPANION TO A POLICY OF STRENGTH IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. SECURITY CANNOT BE ASSURED BY ARMS ALONE. WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT WORLD WAR I ERUPTED IN A EUROPE WHERE A BALANCE OF POWER DID EXIST, A BALANCE THAT WAS DEMONSTRATED BY THREE YEARS OF STALEMATED TRENCH WARFARE. IN AN AGE WHERE ONLY A FEW SMALL WEAPONS WOULD WREAK DEVASTATION EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF THE MAJOR WARS OF RECORDED HISTORY, HOW MUCH GREATER IS THE BURDEN ON US TO SEARCH FOR WAYS TO ENHANCE
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STABILITY WHILE PROTECTING OUR VITAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY INTERESTS.

-- OF THE THREE MAJOR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE IMPORTANCE FOR NATO, SALT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT. WORK ON A SUCCESSOR TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS NINETY PERCENT COMPLETED. THE REMAINING TEN PERCENT, HOWEVER, EMBRACES THE TOUGH ISSUES WITH WHICH THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION MUST GRAPPLE.

-- IN MAY, 1972 THE SOVIETS PLEDGED THEMSELVES IN THE ABM TREATY NOT TO DEFEND MOST OF THEIR TERRITORY AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES AND AGREED NOT TO IMPEDE VERIFICATION MEASURES OF A HIGHLY INTRUSIVE NATURE. THIS STEP WAS ONE OF IMMENSE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE.

-- THE SUCCESS OF SALT IS VITAL TO OUR COMMON FUTURE; THE MAIN LINES OF WHAT WE ARE SEEKING TRANSCEND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES, AND I AM CONVINCED THAT AN AGREEMENT CAN ULTIMATELY BE REACHED WHICH WILL SAFEGUARD THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE US AND THE ALLIANCE.

-- ON MBFR, RESULTS THUS FAR ARE MEAGER AT BEST; BUT I AM PERSUADED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK ENHANCED

STABILITY WITH LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE,
CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED FOR PATIENCE, BUT DETERMINED TO
FIND A PRACTICAL BASIS FOR AGREEMENT.

-- FINALLY, IN CSCEWE NEED TO CONTINUE TO CONSULT
CLOSELY IN THE MONTHS AHEAD TO ENSURE A COMMON APPROACH
TO THE BELGRADE REVIEW CONFERENCE. OUR EFFORTS TO DATE,
BOTH IN THE ALLIANCE AND WITH THE EC-9, ARE AN EXCELLENT
FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER WORK. OUR BASIC TASK IN PRE-
PARING FOR THE BELGRADE MEETING IS TO KEEP ATTENTION
FOCUSED ON EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION. WE NEED TO MAKE
CLEAR OUR DETERMINATION THAT THE PROMISES MADE AT
HELSINKI BE TRANSLATED INTO CONCRETE RESULTS. AT THE
SAME TIME, WE WILL WANT TO ADVANCE A LIMITED NUMBER OF
WESTERN PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE
AND TO PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM "ESCAPING FORWARD"

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THROUGH PROPOSALS OF THEIRS WHICH WOULD SEEK TO DIVERT
ATTENTION FROM THE RECORD SO FAR. WE WILL ALSO WISH TO
AVOID ANY POST-BELGRADE ALL-EUROPEAN POLITICAL ORGAN.
ABOVE ALL, IT WILL BE VITAL FOR US TO MAINTAIN THE
ALLIED UNITY WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED THE ENTIRE CSCE
PROCESS.

CONCLUSION

-- GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE IS NATURAL IN OUR WESTERN
SOCIETIES BUT CERTAIN NEEDS TRANSCEND POLITICS. THE
MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE IS TO MAINTAIN OUR COLLECTIVE
DEFENSE AND POLITICAL SOLIDARITY AND THUS GUARANTEE OUR
COMMON SECURITY.

-- THE CHALLENGE FOR OUR ALLIANCE IS, AS IN THE PAST,
TO MEET SOVIET STRENGTH WITH STRENGTH OF OUR OWN--
POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND MORAL STRENGTH--TO
CONTINUE TRYING TO MOLD SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN CHANNELS
OF GREATER RESTRAINT AND RESPONSIBILITY, AND TO KEEP
SEEKING POSSIBILITIES FOR ACCOMMODATION WHICH WILL
MAKE THE WORLD MORE SECURE.

-- THE KEY TO OUR SUCCESS IS TO WORK TOGETHER AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GREAT WESTERN DEMOCRACIES SO
THAT, IN THE WORDS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, WE
WILL BE ABLE "TO SAFEGUARD THE FREEDOM, COMMON
HERITAGE AND CIVILIZATION" OF ALL OF US.

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ROBINSON

SECRET

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